

TOP SECRET

25X1



8 January 1959

Copy No. C 63


25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 30
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: 4480
DATE: 4480 REVIEWER: 25X1

25X1



DIA AND DOS review(s)
completed.

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

8 January 1959

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

NO
25X1 Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: The Berlin situation remains potentially dangerous but will probably not develop into a crisis during Mikoyan's visit. [REDACTED] 25X1

NO
25X1 Watch Committee conclusion--Taiwan Strait: There were no developments noted during the past week which reflect a change in Chinese Communist intentions regarding the Taiwan Strait situation. The intensified shelling on 7 January appears to be another Chinese Communist effort to maintain tension in the area. [REDACTED] 25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO
25X1 Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: A deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future. The situation, however, remains precarious throughout the area. In Iraq, Communist influence and activity continue to pose the threat of eventual Communist control of the government. [REDACTED] 25X1

140
Watch Committee conclusion--Southeast Asia: Political 25X1
plotting in Cambodia against Premier Sihanouk, abetted by
Thailand and South Vietnam, and Viet Minh military pressures
on the borders of Laos may provide further opportunities for
increased Communist penetration in Southeast Asia.

25X1

25X1
Afghanistan-USSR: Afghanistan apparently intends to ex-
pand further its relations with the USSR. The communiqué is-
sued on 5 January at the end of Foreign Minister Naim's visit
to Moscow indicates a new Soviet economic assistance agree-
ment may be reached in the near future. While the communiqué
itself contains no reference to any new military agreement, its
wording does not exclude such an agreement. Naim's visit em-
phasizes Kabul's increasing concern about a possible threat from
Pakistan and its desire to find a counter to this threat.

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

OK
Finland: Parliament has been ordered to reconvene on
8 January, four days early, in order to form a government to
replace the five-party Fagerholm coalition, which resigned on
4 December largely because of Soviet pressure.

25X1

25X1

Belgium: [In reaction to the rioting in Leopoldville, Belgian
opinion generally is concerned but is not calling for repressive
measures or drastic changes in policy. The prime minister has
called an emergency session of Parliament for 8 January in]

25X1

8 Jan 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

response to the King, who is reported extremely disturbed about the situation. The government is considering reinforcement of army units in the Congo. The basic factors giving rise to the disturbances have not changed. (Page 5)

25X1

OK Cuba: The Cuban Communist party (PSP) has succeeded in obtaining a minority voice in the organized labor movement and is represented on an employee committee which is attempting to take over the management of the Cuban Electric Company, a subsidiary of a US firm. The PSP is acting openly to create an impression of legality. However, the Urrutia government has not recognized the party.

25X1

NO Honduras: An imminent movement by Honduran rebels now concentrating along the border in Nicaragua is feared by the Honduran foreign minister. He complained in a 6 January talk with the US ambassador that Nicaragua is assisting the rebel force and said Honduras may as a last resort take the case to the OAS. The Nicaraguan armed forces chief, General Somoza, told the US Embassy on 3 January that there were 300 to 400 Honduran civilians at the border.

25X1

25X1

25X1

8 Jan 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Reaction to UAR Anti-Communist Moves

[Soviet leaders may be exerting behind-the-scenes pressure on Nasir to limit his anti-Communist moves by bringing to his attention the importance of continued bloc military and economic assistance, but they apparently hope to avoid an open clash with Cairo.]

[REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] the Soviet Government has halted training of Egyptian jet pilots now in the USSR. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] The Soviet Union used the argument that the pilots must learn Russian before undergoing further training. Nasir, described as "astonished," is said to feel that the suspension has political motivations, inasmuch as several classes have completed training without any language problems.]

[The Soviet Union has apparently also exerted pressure in its economic relations with the UAR since the initial signs of Nasir's recent concern over Communist activities in the area. The Soviet delegation negotiating the final details of the agreement to aid the UAR in building the first stage of the Aswan Dam reportedly prolonged the negotiations and imposed conditions which were reluctantly accepted by Cairo on 27 December. Nasir has also complained recently that the USSR is lagging on implementing the aid program to Syria.]

[Bloc propaganda media have reported the arrests of Communists in the UAR, but are ignoring Nasir's role in ordering the crackdown and his criticism of Communist activities in the Arab world. Soviet commentators have adopted the view that Western "imperialist" agents are responsible for planting the Arab press stories of the Communist danger to the Arab unity movement. The Soviet ambassador to the UAR is reported by an extreme leftist newspaper in Cairo on 7 January to have stated that the crackdown on Communists in the UAR is "strictly an internal affair."] 25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

Nasir's Anti-Communist Campaign

[REDACTED]
[Nasir's campaign against Communists throughout the UAR has reached major proportions. This campaign, unlike previous ones, has included arrests of prominent party members, and it would appear that Communist leadership has been severely crippled. [REDACTED] about 550 members have been arrested in Syria, including Mustafa Amin, one of the highest in the party. Also reportedly picked up was Abd al-Majid Jamal al-Din, a leader of the Syrian-Lebanese Communist party and head of the Syrian passports and immigration department. Khalid Bakdash, the Arab world's number-one Communist, reportedly has fled from Damascus to Baghdad.]

25X1

[In Egypt, where Cairo newspapers are keeping up a constant barrage of criticism of Iraqi Communist activity, the number of arrests has exceeded 200, including several central committee members of Egypt's three Communist factions, as well as Communist members of the staff of the extreme leftist Cairo daily Al Misaa. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]
25X1

25X1

Fear of Pakistan May Cause Afghanistan to Expand Soviet Relations

[REDACTED] 25X1

The Afghan Government apparently intends to expand its relations with the Soviet Union. The communiqué issued on 5 January at the end of Foreign Minister Naim's visit to Moscow indicates that a new Soviet economic assistance agreement will be concluded in the near future. Although no mention is made of any new military agreement, the wording of the communiqué allows for such an agreement.

25X6

In addition, the Afghans probably view the establishment of a new regional administration for Pakistan's northwest frontier region as confirmation of Pakistan's determination to ignore Afghanistan in the handling of Pushtoonistan.

25X6

25X1

III. THE WEST

Finnish Parliament Convened to Settle Government Crisis

The speaker of the Finnish Diet has ordered parliament to reconvene on 8 January, four days before the scheduled end of the Christmas recess, in order to deal with the problem of forming a government. He acted in response to appeals from the parliamentary leaders of three non-Communist parties, following fruitless talks over the week end. Since 4 December, when the five-party Fagerholm coalition resigned largely because of Soviet pressure, Finland has had only a caretaker government.

The major obstacle to the formation of a government seems to be the question of forming a viable cabinet enjoying broad support and able to deal with the USSR without including in some manner the Communist-front People's Democratic League (SKDL). President Kekkonen reportedly feels that only a government including the SKDL or at least supported by it will satisfy the USSR and lead to a normalization of relations between Finland and the USSR. However, the non-Communist parties, except for the opposition Social Democrats and some elements within the Agrarian party, still oppose collaboration with the SKDL.

The Moscow press continues to attack the Finns. Izvestia on 7 January accused "Finnish right-wing circles" of trying to hamper trade relations between the two countries and to undermine Finnish neutrality. Moreover, there is no indication as yet that the suspended Soviet trade payments have been resumed, and as of 30 December the USSR had still made no moves regarding any intergovernmental negotiations, including the 1959 trade agreement.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Belgians Call Emergency Parliament Session to Discuss Leopoldville Riots

[REDACTED] 25X1

[Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens has called an emergency session of Parliament for 8 January to discuss the riots in Leopoldville, possibly in response to pressure from King Baudouin, who is reported extremely disturbed about the situation. In Brussels generally, there has been concern, but no call yet for drastic changes in policy.]

[Despite some evidence of differences in the cabinet on the seriousness of the situation, the government seems to be completing preparations for reinforcement of army units in the Congo in the event that a renewal of the disturbances makes it necessary. The American air attaché has reported indications of intense joint army - air force staff activity on the logistical side.]

[The government's new program for the Congo, which is scheduled to be announced on 13 January, is supposed to be "generous and bold," and will probably involve political as well as economic, educational, and some judicial reforms. Ultimate internal political autonomy is foreseen, but extensive political rights will probably not be granted to the Congolese at this time. The Belgian press suggests that public opinion does not deem repressive measures necessary in the Congo, and attributes the riots to the vast number of unemployed among the African population in Leopoldville. The basic factors which gave rise to the three-day rioting, however, have not changed and further disturbances are possible.]

25X1

25X1

Communist Party Activities in Cuba

The Cuban Communist party (PSP) has come into the open since Batista's downfall and is attempting to create an impression of legality. It has not, however, been recognized by the Urrutia government. Since 1 January, the PSP has opened two offices in Havana--the first time the party has acted so overtly since Batista outlawed it in 1953.

As expected, the PSP is making a strong bid for a dominant role in the organized labor movement. It has succeeded in obtaining a minority voice in the "National United Workers' Front" (FONU), a labor coalition group which has assumed control over the Confederation of Cuban Workers. The other four member groups of the FONU are anti-Communist and represent the major rebel and political organizations which opposed the Batista regime.

[REDACTED]
25X1

The PSP has maintained a hard core of experienced labor organizers during its years underground, and probably has more capable labor leaders available than do the rebel and political groups which now control the government. Castro's labor organization, which succeeded in infiltrating organized labor during the last months of the rebellion, maintained ties with Catholic labor groups and is believed to have rebuffed Communist offers of "aid." The new labor minister, Manuel Fernandez, is also said to have connections with Catholic labor organizations, and according to the US Embassy in Havana, enjoys a fine reputation although he is young and inexperienced in the labor field. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1
[REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200300001-1

TOP SECRET